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TRANSWORLD DAMNATION AND CRAIG'S
CONTENTIOUS SUGGESTION
Raymond J. VanArragon

In this paper I discuss William Lane Craig's response to problems faced by
Molinists who hold that an eternal hell exists and that most people who fail
to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up there. Craig suggests that
it is plausible to suppose that most people who fai! to accept Christ suffer
from transworld damnation, and that the fact that they do ensures that it is
fair that they end up in hell regardless of whether they hear the Gospel
message. I argue that whether this suggestion-which I caU 'Craig's contentious suggestion'-is true depends on how transworld damnation is
understood. I present four interpretations of transworld damnation, and
argue that on three of the interpretations Craig's suggestion is clearly unacceptable, but that it may be acceptable on the fourth.

The following is a commonly held Christian belief:
(1)

A non-empty hell exists, and is the place where all people not
saved by Christ's redemptive work spend eternity apart from
God.

Some troubling questions and problems might arise for the person who
accepts (1). Why does God permit a place like h.ell to exist? Why doesn't
God save all people he created, or eventually reconcile all of them to himself? It seems that God would want to do so, and would (or at least should)
be able to; so why doesn't he?
More problems attend the conjunction of (1) with
(2)

All or most people who fail to accept Christ during their earthly
lives (including those who never hear the Gospel) end up in
hell.

Inparticular, the parenthetical clause in (2) raises questions. How can it be
fair that all or most of those who never even hear the Gospel (the 'uninformed') are damned, and spend eternity in hell?l It seems that they don't
really get the opportunity to avoid hell and attain salvation. This fact may
by itself make their plight seem unfair, but the unfairness is certainly compounded by the fact that many people who at least appear to be no more
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deserving are granted that opportunity, and take it. In sum, it is clear that
Christians who accept (1) and (2) face some difficult intellectual problems
as a result of doing so.
Now the Christian Molinist who accepts (1) and (2) is by no means
exempt from the problems they generate. Here's why: the Molinist
believes that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom-that is,
there are truths about what each person would freely do were she placed
in any set of circumstances in which she could freely act. For exan1ple,
there are truths about what each person would freely do if she were placed
in Europe during the Second World War and given the choice about
whether to risk her life by hiding Jews from the Nazis. The Molinist also
believes that, prior to creating the world, God knew which counterfactuals
were true. God knew, for example, who would freely hide Jews and who
would not, and in exactly what circumstances those people would make
those choices. Finally, the Molinist believes that God used that knowledge
in deciding which possible world to actualize. That is, God used his
knowledge of what creatures would freely do in any situation in which
they could exercise freedom to create a world in which his purposes would
be fulfilled. 2
Given these beliefs, then, the Molinist who accepts (1) and (2) must hold
that God knew before creating this world that 11is doing so would result in
many of his creatures spending an eternity in hell. Moreover, she must
hold that God knew exacHy which people would fail to accept Christ, and
that many of those who would fail to accept Christ (and end up in hell)
would be uninformed. But then, first, why did God actualize this possible
world? Why didn't God instead actualize a world in which there is no hell,
and everyone is saved? Second, regarding those people who do not accept
Christ, why didn't God place them in situations in which he knew they
would freely accept Christ? And particularly with regard to the uninformed, why didn't God at least create a world in which they are placed in
situations where the Gospel is presented to them in a clear and persuasive
fashion? Why didn't God give them a chance? It seems that these are
questions to which a Molinist who accepts (1) and (2) should hope to find
adequate answers.
Now William Lane Craig is such a Molinist. 3 He believes that an eternal
hell exists, and that nearly everyone who fails to accept Christ during her
earthly life ends up there-nearly everyone because son1e of those to whom
the Gospel is never preached may yet be saved on account of their responding appropriately to "general revelation and the light that they do have"
(186). However, "on the basis of Scripture we must say that such 'anonymous Christians' are relatively rare" (186, myemphasis).4 Craig also recognizes the problems that those beliefs seem to present, and he makes use of
the notion of transworld damnation-which is, roughly, the condition afflicting
any person who would freely reject the salvation offered through Christ in
any situation in which she were free to accept it-to give possible SOlLltions
to those problems. By doing so, he aims to show that the conjunction of (1)
and (2) is compatible with the Molinist view of divine providence.
Craig suggests the following possible solution to the problems generated by (1). He claims that it is possible that every feasible world (that is,
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every world which God is able to actualize, given which counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom are true)5 that contains a significant nun1ber of saved
persons also contains a significant number of persons who suffer from
transworld damnation. It is also possible that, taken as a whole, a world
that contains a significant number of saved persons is better than a world
containing only a few. Hence, Craig suggests, it is possible that in order to
create a really good world, God had to create a significant number of persons afflicted with transworld damnation-persons wh~ are damned
because God is unable to procure their free acceptance of salvation, and
would be unable to do so no matter what feasible world he actualized.
The pressing problem attending (2) is the problem of the uninformed-it
seems unfair for a person who does not accept Christ to be damned if she
never heard the Gospel message. 6 In response to this problem, Craig suggests that it is possible that God has arranged things so that those who are
uninformed al1d damned suffer from transworld damnation, and 11ence
wouldn't have accepted Christ even if the Gospel had been proclaimed to
them. If that is so, then none of them can rightly complain, "This is so
unfair. If things in my life that were beyond my control had gone differently, I would have freely accepted Christ," because, in fact, they wouldn't
have done so (186).7 So the fact that uninformed people suffer from
transworld damnation ensures that it is fair that they are damned even
though they did not have the opportunity to accept Christ during their
earthly lives.
Thus the notion of transworld damnation can be used to give a response
to questions that arise for the Molinist who accepts (1) and (2), a response
that is at least possibly true (and hence the Molinist view of divine providence is shown to be compatible with the conjunction of (1) and (2)). But
Craig goes fLlrther: he suggests that his response is not merely possible; it is
also plausible (186). He suggests that it is plausible to suppose that God has
created a world containing hell (and individuals who suffer from
transworld damnation) because no worlds that lacked it were sufficiently
good; and moreover, it is plausible to suppose that it is fair that most of
those who fai! to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up in hell
regardless of whetl1er they heard the Gospel, because they suffer from
transworld damnation. The second part of Craig's suggestion-the part
which I will call Craig' s contentious suggestion-will be the focus of this
paper. 8 We can characterize it as follows:

Craig's Contentious Suggestion: It is plausible to suppose that (a) n10st
of those who do not accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer
from transworld damnation, and (b) the fact that a person suffers
from transworld damnation ensures that it is fair that she ends up in
hell, even if she never hears the Gospel message.
But is Craig's contentious suggestion correct? I think that to answer this
question we must examine more carefully what transworld damnation iso
In this paper, then, I want to investigate the notion of transworld
damnation in the context of Craig's contentious suggestion. I will argue
that whether it is reasonable to accept Craig's suggestion depends on how
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the notion of transworld damnation is understood. I will suggest four
interpretations of transworld damnation. The first two can be derived
from Craig's own account of it; I will argue that on each of these, Craig's
suggestion is unacceptable, because it is not at all plausible to suppose that
most of those who in fact do not accept Christ suffer from transworld
damnation. The second two interpretations are weakened versions of the
first two, but while perhaps neither faces the problem that the first two do,
one of them is such that it is not plausible to suppose that the fact that a
person suffers from it ensures that it is fair that she ends up in hell even if
she never hears the Gospel. I will argue that the other weakened interpretation shows the most promise; I will conclude by discussing the prospects
for defending Craig's contentious suggestion using that interpretation of
transworld damnation.
I

What is transworld damnation? I think that Craig's account of it is somewhat ambiguous. There are two ways to understand hirn. I will consider
both ways, and give textual support for each; tlLen I will discuss whether it
is plausible to suppose that most people who fai! to accept Christ during
their earthly lives suffer from either version of it.
The first interpretation of transworld damnation is this:
TOF The property of being such that in every feasible world in which
one exists, one does not freely accept Christ.
Craig supports this interpretation when he says that the property of
transworld damnatiolL is "possessed by any person who freely does not
respond to God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible for God in
which that person exists" (184, emphasis mine). And William Hasker, in
his response to Craig's essay, also assurnes this interpretation to be the
right one. 9
The second interpretation is this:
TOS The property of being such that, for every situation hL which
one's essence might be instantiated and one left free with
respect to accepting Christ, one would in fact freely not accept
Christ in that situation.
This interpretation requires some explanation. A situation, as I am using
the term, specifies a complete set of circumstances in which a person might
be placed and left free with respect to performing some action. Take a situation J which is such that if aperson, Joe, were placed in it, he would be
free with respect to accepting Christ. Since he would be free in J, nothing
about J entails that in it Joe would make one choice instead of another. In
other words, there are possible worlds in which Joe freely accepts Christ in
J, and possible worlds in which he freely does not do so. Now return to the
TOS interpretation of transworld damnation. If Joe suffers from TOS,
then he would in fact freely not accept Christ in J, or in any other situation in

TRAN5WORLD DAMNATION

245

which he would be free with respect to doing so. Then for any such situation, God cannot actualize a world in which Joe freely accepts Christ in that
situation-which means that God can't actualize any world in which Joe
freely accepts Christ. lO
While TDS and TDF n1ay initially appear to be logically equivalent, we
should be clear that they are not. If Joe suffers from TDS, then he fails to
freely accept Christ in all feasible worlds in which he exists, just as he does
if he suffers fron1 TDF. So suffering from TDS implies suffering from TDF.
But the reverse is not the case. If Joe suffers from TDF, it n1ay be that he
would accept Christ in some situation in which he would be free to do so.
After all, suppose for some situation J that if Joe were placed in it he would
freely accept Christ. Then if God could actualize a possible world in which
J obtains, he could also actualize a world in which Joe freely accepts Christ
in J. But suppose God couldn't actualize any possible world in which J
obtains, because actualizing such a world would require the free cooperation of other people, cooperation tl1at those people in fact would not give.
In that case, Joe could suffer from TDF (since the worlds in which he freely
accepts Christ in J are infeasible), even though he doesn't suffer from TDS
(there is a situation, namely J, such that he would freely accept Christ in it).
So suffering from TDF does not imply suffering from TDS.
In support of the TDS interpretation, we see that in preparing to introduce the concept of transworld damnation, Craig says that the theist could
hold that the proposition "God knows for any individual 5 under what circumstances 5 would freely receive Christ" is false because it is possible that
"[f]or some individual 5, there are no circumstances under which 5 would
freely receive Christ" (181, emphasis mine). For reasons we have just seen,
this latter proposition is true only if 5 suffers from transworld damnation
on the TDS construal. If 5 suffers from TDS, then it is not the case that
God knows under what circumstances (that is, in what situations) 5 would
freely receive Christ, because there are no such circumstances. On the
other hand, if 5 suffers from TDF but not TDS, then there are circumstances under which 5 would freely receive Christ, and God knows what
theyare (even though he cannot actualize any worlds that contain them).
Before we evaluate Craig's contentious suggestion using these two
interpretations of transworld danmation, we sh.ould note two things about
them. First, I think we need to add another clause to the above definitions
in order to ensure that those who suffer from transworld damnation are
such that God is simply unable to proeure their free acceptance of salvation. After all, the definitions imply that God is unable to proeure their free
acceptance of Christ; but we have seen that Craig thinks there is another
way to accept salvation-one might respond appropriately to general revelation. In other words, given our definitions of transworld damnation, it
could be that God is unable to get a transworldly-damned person to freely
accept Christ during her earthly life, but is nonetheless able to attain her
free acceptance of salvation by getting her to freely respond appropriately
to general revelation. So we should suppose that each definition contains
an additional clause with the implication that God would be unable to proeure fron1 a person who suffers from it an appropriate free response to
general revelation. (In order to keep the definitions neat, however, I will
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not rewrite them to take this into account.)
Second, the TOF interpretation of transworld damnation is the weaker
of the two. As we have seen, suffering from TOS implies suffering from
TOF, but the reverse is not the case. Here is another way to see the same
point. Suffering from TOS implies being such that one would freely reject
Christ in any possible situation in which one would be free to accept hirn.
On the other hand, suffering from TOF only implies being such that one
would freely reject Christ in those situations which one actually encounters
in the feasible worlds in which one exists. So the situations in which a
TOF-sufferer would freely reject Christ are a subset of the TOS
situations-and perhaps a rather small subset. ll Since the TOF version of
Craig's contentious suggestion is the weaker of the two, in wh.at follows I
will focus my attention on it. We will see that if it is implausible to suppose that most of those who don't accept Christ during their earthly lives
suffer from TOF, it will be at least as implausible to suppose that they suffer from TOS, and hence that Craig's suggestion should be rejected on
either interpretation.
On the TOF interpretation, Craig's suggestion implies th.at nearly every
person who does not accept Christ during her earthly life is such that she
does not freely accept Christ in any feasible world in which she exists. To
put it another way, for any situation which she encounters in some feasible
world and in which she is left free with respect to accepting Christ, in that
feasible world she freely does not accept Christ in that situation. In. order
to show that this suggestion is unacceptable, I will argue first that a situation can strongly incline a person to accept Christ without compromising
her ability to do so freely, and second that in the set of feasible worlds, for
any person there will likely be many persuasive situations in which that
person is free to accept the offer of salvation during her earthly life, either
by accepting Christ or by responding appropriately to general revelation. 12
First, in what situations is a person free to accept Christ? It seen1S clear
that if being in a certain situation entails that one will accept Christ, then
one would not be free with respect to accepting Christ if placed in that situation. Such a situation, we might say, would be maximally persuasive with
respect to accepting Christ. Perhaps an example of a maximally persuasive
situation is one in which the angel Gabriel appears to aperson, discusses
with that person his sins, shows hirn the plight of the damned, and
explains to hirn that turning his life around and accepting Christ is the only
way for hirn to avoid such a fate. Perhaps it is plausible to suppose that in
a situatiol1like that the subject will accept Christ, but will not do so freely,
since the situation has inclined hirn so strongly to accept Christ as to override his freedom. 13
So tl1ere may be situations or circumstances which entail that the person
experiencing them will accept Christ, thus eliminating that person's ability
to accept Christ freely. But of course there are also less persuasive situations than the Gabriel scenario, situations which might incline a person to
accept Christ without eliminating the person's freedom. While a person
may lack the ability to freely accept Christ in the Gabriel situation, that
doesn't mean he lacks the same ability, say, at a Billy Graham rally, when
half of his formerly agnostic friends have gone up to the front and half
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remain seated. So we may suppose that there is a wide range of situations
which incline a person (more or less strongly) to accept Christ; perhaps
freedom is eliminated at the high-inclination end, but it is present somewhere on the way down.
The question is, how far must we go down the 'inclination scale' before
freedom is present? I want to suggest that a situation can incline a person
very strongly to accept Christ without impinging on her ability to do so
freely. And I think that many Christian libertarians (including Molinists)
would tend to agree with this suggestion. After all, such Christians often
agree that God would prefer that those who receive Christ do so freely;
and many people in fact accept Christ in situations which strongly incline
them to do so. For example, many people accept Christ as a result of being
raised as members of caring Christian families, or as a result of the evangelical efforts of committed Christians for whom they have much love and
respect. These situations would strongly incline a person to accept Christ.
If such situations eliminate freedom with respect to receiving Christ, then it
seems to follow that a good many people who have accepted Christ have
not done so freely. Given our initial premise-that God would prefer that
those who receive Christ do so freely-this result is unpleasant. I suggest
then. that it is plausible to think that in those situations people are free with
respect to accepting Christ. Such situations are very persuasive-those who
are placed in them are the recipients of much grace-but in them a person's
freedom is not overridden.
On then to the second step. How many situations wherein he is free
with respect to accepting Christ is a person likely to encounter in all of the
feasible worlds? I believe that it is plausible to suppose that any person is
likely to encounter many such situations, and indeed many very persuasive
situations. My first argument for this conclusion is this: consider persons A
and B. In the actual world, A is not exposed to the Gospel, while B is
raised in a caring Christian family. Doesn't it seem plausible to suppose
that God could actualize a world in which A and B swap places, so that in
that world A is placed in a very persuasive situation with respect to accepting Christ? I think it does. In general, I think that for any persuasive situation in which person B finds herself by virtue of having the parents she has
(parents who choose to raise their children in a Christian way), in some
feasible world person A experiences a situation just like it. But then since
many people find themselves in very persuasive situations with respect to
accepting Christ in the actual world by virtue of having the parents they
have, it follows that any person faces many such situations in the feasible
worlds in which she exists.
Now this argument may not sway those who believe that one's parents
are essential to one. For if one's parents are essential to one, then God may
not be able to 'move people arollnd' in the way just described. So let me
try again. I take it as given that there are an enorn10US number of feasible
worlds. Consider, then, person A who is not informed about Christ in the
actual world: isn't it plausible to suppose that there are many feasible
worlds in which gifted missionaries decide to preach to hin1? That there
are many worlds in which either missionaries who have decided to preach
in the actual world change their routes and preach to A, or different people
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(even people who do not exist in the actual world) decide to preach to A, or
A lives in a different village in the path of a missionary? Isn't it plausible to
suppose that in some feasible worlds, the spread of the Christian religion
takes a different path, and A is in fact caught up in the middle of it? If so,
then in the feasible worlds in which A exists, he encounters many situations in which he is free with respect to accepting Christ, and no doubt
many of those situations will be very persuasive.
But suppose that this conclusion is mistaken, and it is plausible to think
that there are many unfortunate people who encounter hardly any persuasive situations in the feasible worlds in which they exist. Even so, it is surely the case that those people are likely (in worlds God is able to actualize)
to encounter many persuasive situations with respect to responding appropriately to general revelation. 14 After all, it seems that if in world W God
sees that none of God's creatures are doing their part in presenting the
Gospel to A, God would try hard to attain A's free acceptance of salvation
another way-through general revelation. 15 Thus even if A is not placed in
too many persuasive situations (with respect to accepting Christ) as a
result of the free actions of others, it's plausible to suppose that A is still
placed in many very persuasive situations (with respect to responding
appropriately to general revelation) as a result of God's own actions.
I conclude then that a situation can strongly incline a person to accept
Christ without compromising her freedom, and that it is plausible to suppose that every person encounters many very persuasive situations with
respect to accepting Christ (or with respect to responding appropriately to
general revelation)16 in the feasible worlds in which she exists. It seems
clear to me, given these conclusions, that it is prima facie plausible to think
that TDF is a rare property-it is prima facie plausible to think that of the
people God created, relatively few suffer from it. After all, it would be
unlikely that a person would reject Christ in one very persuasive situation,
and it would be much more unlikely that a person would do so in every
one of the many such situations he faces in worlds God could actualize.
Of course, if Craig's contentious suggestion is correct, then what is prima
facie plausible may not be plausible upon further investigation. After all,
billions of people fai! to accept Christ during their earthly lives, and if
Craig's suggestion is correct, then it is plausible to suppose that most of
them suffer from TDF. If most of them do, then it turns out that TDF is not
a rare property at all-indeed, "the vast majority of persons" God created
suffer from it (176)! However, I think th.at comn10n sense considerations
about typical uninformed people in this world can help to confirm the plausibility of the claim that TDF really is a rare property, and hence help to
show that the TDF interpretation of Craig's suggestion should be rejected.
Consider a typical person not informed about Christ in this world-a
Native American, perhaps, before Europeans arrived. An important point
to consider is that she probably is 'religious'; she probably follows the religiOl1 of her community. Suppose that she is religious: is it plausible to suppose that she would not freely accept Christ or respond appropriately to
general revelation in any feasible world?17 Perhaps we might reasonably
consider her a candidate for TDF transworld damnation if she demonstrated no religious tendencies at all-showed no inclü1ation to worship and
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give herself over to a 'higher power,' and behaved in a most self-centered
manner at every turn. But given that she is religious (however misguided),
I think we can't plausibly suppose that she suffers from it. Moreover, it
seems utterly implausible to suppose that most of her peers, together with
most other 'religious' people never informed about Christ, suffer from it.
These considerations reinforce our initial inclination to think th.at TDF is a
rare property-rare among the uninformed, and hence rare among those
who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives 18-and thus that it seems
not at all plausible to suppose that most of those who fail to accept Christ
suffer from TDF. I conclude, then, that on the TDF interpretation, Craig's
contentious suggestion should be rejected. 19
It is easy to see that if Craig's suggestion should be rejected on the TDF
interpretation, it should be rejected even more emphatically when it is
understood in terms of TDS transworld damll.ation. After all, suffering
from TDS entails that one would reject Christ in at least as many persuasive
situations with respect to accepting Christ as suffering from TDF does-and
probably many more. Thus TDS is probably a much rarer property than
TDF, and it is prima facie even less plausible to suppose that most of the billions of people who do not accept Christ suffer from it. Moreover, common
sense considerations about typical uninformed people will reinforce our initial intuitions 011. tl1.e matter: it seems hopelessly implausible to suppose that
most of the uninformed and hence most of those who don't ll1. fact accept
Christ would reject him in all possible situations in which they would be
free to accept hirn. So if we employ the TDS interpretation of transworld
damnation, Craig's contentious suggestion should again be rejected.
11

As they stand, then, the TOF and TOS interpretations are too strong to
make it plausible to suppose that most people who do 11.0t accept Christ in
this world suffer from one or the other. But perhaps we can weaken those
interpretations by making some rough distinctions: we can distinguish situations based on how strongly they incline one to accept Christ. As we
have seen, it is clear that some situations can incline a person more strongly to accept Christ than others. Some situations may be maximally persuasive with respect to accepting Christ, but situations which deserve that designatio11. may eliminate the freedom of the agent experiencing them. Other
situations strongly incline a person to accept Christ, but can plausibly be
supposed not to eliminate freedom. We have said that being raised in a
caring Christia11. family may constitute such a situation. Perhaps we can
call situations like these highly persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ. Similarly, we can call situations which have only amid-range
inclining power moderately persuasive situations with respect to accepting
Christ. These may include situations like that in which one is told about
Christ by a preacher of ordinary skill, or in which one attends a Billy
Graham rally wl1.ere half of one's friends accept Christ while the other half
do not. We may suppose that such situations are persuasive enough that
at least some people would accept Christ as a result of being in them, but
some people would not. We may classify still other situatio11.S based on
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their having less and less persuasive power; but for our purposes the three
types of situations we have labeled are sufficient.
Using these distinctions, we can weakell. TDF and TDS respectively, as
follows:
TDF2

The property of being such that, in every feasible world in
which one exists and is placed only in moderately (or less) persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ, one freely
does not accept Christ.

TDS2

The property of being such that, for every moderately (or less)
persuasive situation in which one's essence might be instantiated and one left free with respect to accepting Christ, one
would in fact freely not accept Christ in that situation. 20

Note th.at in the original definitions of transworld damnation I attributed
to Craig, a person who has the property would not freely accept Christ in
any feasible worlds or possible situations; a person who suffers merely
from TDF2 or TDS 2 would be such that she would accept Christ in some
highly persuasive and feasible situations. So while a person who suffered
from one of the more extreme versions of transworld damnation would be
such that eod would be unable to get her to freely accept Christ, eod
would be able to get a person who suffered merely from TDF2 or TDS 2 to
accept Christ by actualizing a world in which she is placed in the right
highly persuasive situation with respect to doing

SO.21,22

This feature of our

moderate versions of transworld damnation demands attention, and I will
return to it in Section IV. In the next section, I will pay most attention to
the TDF2 interpretation of Craig's contentious suggestion, and argue that
even if it is plausible to suppose that most of those who fail to accept Christ
during their earthly lives in fact suffer from TDF 2, the fact that an uninformed person suffers from it does not ensure that it is fair that she is
damned, because it could be that she suffers from it because she is uninformed-because potential missionaries chose not to preach. to her. So use
of this version may render the first part of Craig's contentious suggestion
acceptable, but not the second. I will conclude in the final sectioll. with
some brief remarks about TDS 2-which I consider the more promising
interpretation-and discuss the prospects for defending Craig's contentious
suggestion using that version of transworld damnation.
111

I will evaluate Craig's contentious suggestion on the TDF2 interpretation
of transworld damnation in the context of a discussion of n1issions, and in
particular a discussion of counterfactuals involving the free choices of
potential missionaries. Craig puts much emphasis on their importance for
keeping people out of hell; as he says, "it is our duty to proclaim the gospel
to the whole world, trusting that eod has so providentially ordered things
that through us the good news will be brought to persons who eod knew
would respond if they heard it" (186). On his view, if a competent mis-
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sionary--eall hirn Peter--ehooses to preach to the inhabitants of some remote
village V, then it will probably be the case that some members of V will
accept Christ, and Peter's work will not be in vain. However, if Peter (with
all other competent potential missionaries) chooses not to preach the
Gospel to the inhabitants of V, then all of the members of V will suffer
from transworld damnation and be damned. 23 So on Craig's view, Peter's
choice is an important one.
Now William Hasker claims24 that Craig's view has a fatal consequence:
it implies that there are probably some inhabitants of V such that Peter is
responsible for whether they suffer from transworld damnation. In what
follows I will briefly explain Hasker's objection and why, if correct, it renders Craig's contentious suggestion unacceptable. Then I will outline
Craig's response to the objection in order to help clarify his considered
position about the counterfactual implications of Peter's choice.
Hasker argues that, on Craig's view, prior to Peter's making his choice
the following proposition is probably true:
(3)

There exists some person such that (a) Peter will freely choose
whether or not to preach the Gospel to this person, and (b) if
Peter were to preach the Gospel to her, it would be the case that,
if Peter were to preach to her, she would freely accept salvation,
whereas (c) if Peter were not to preach to her, she would suffer
from transworld damnation and it would not be the case that, if
Peter were to preach to her, she would freely accept salvation. 25

That is, Hasker thinks that on Craig's view, before Peter decides whether to
go to the mission field, it is probably tl'le case that some of the inhabitants
of V are such that whether they suffer from transworld damnation
depends on what he will choose. 26 If Peter will decide to preach, then those

inhabitants will accept Christ and hence will not suffer from transworld
damnation. Bl.lt if Peter will decide not to preach, then they-together with
all of their fellow villagers-will suffer from it. So whether these inhabitants
suffer from transworld damnation depends on whether Peter will preach
the Gospel to them.
Now if Hasker is right about tl'lis, then Craig's contentious suggestion
(on any interpretation of transworld damnation) should be rejected immediately. After all, Craig's suggestion purports to explain why it is fair that
the uninformed are damned-it is fair because they suffer from transworld
damnation. But if it turns out that they (or some of them) suffer from
transworld damnation because they are uninformed (i.e. because potential
missionaries chose not to preach to them), then the explanation is clearly
inadequate. Indeed, in that case, the explanation is, in a certain hard-todefine way, circular; in effect, the explanation (or at least part of the explanation) for why it's fair that the uninformed are damned is that they are
uninformed. In short, we cannot say that the fact that a person suffers
from transworld damnatiol'l ensures that it is fair that she ends up in hell
even though she never heard the Gospel, if she suffers from it because she
never heard the Gospel. And Hasker is claiming that on Craig's accoLmt
there probably are people in that predicament-people who suffer fron1

252

Faith and Philosophy

transworld damnation as a result of the fact that potential missionaries like
Peter freely chose not to preach the Gospel to them. If Hasker's objection is
correct, then Craig's suggestion is unacceptable.
But Craig has a quick response to Hasker's objection. 27 We can understand it this way: consider village V in two worlds, one in which Peter
decides to preach, and one in which he decides not to. Hasker seems to
think that Craig is committed to saying that V has the same inhabitants in
both worlds-and that whether some of them suffer from transworld
damnation probably depends on whether Peter decides to preach. But in
fact Craig isn't committed to this, because on his view there will be different
people in the village in those different worlds. On his view, if Peter (with
every other competent potential missionary) were to freely choose not to
go to V, then God, foreknowing that Peter would make th.at choice, instead
of having populated V with some people who would accept Christ if Peter
preached to th.em, would have populated V only with people who in fact
do suffer from transworld damnation, and "would not in any case respond
to the gospel even if they heard it."28 So while the decision Peter will make
may have an effect on what people will have come to exist in V, it will not
be the case that whether a person suffers from transworld damnation
depends on wh.ether Peter preaches the Gospel to her; hence Hasker's
objection fails.
We should recall at this point that Hasker is working with a TDF interpretation of transworld damnation. I have already dismissed the version
of Craig's contentious suggestion which makes use of this interpretation by
arguing that it is utterly implausible to suppose that most people who do
not accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer from TDF. But it is clear,
I think, that a TDF interpretation of transworld damnation does not face
the problem that Hasker claims it does. 29 In what follows, however, I will
show that given the more plausible TDF2 interpretation, a similar problem
arises-and Craig's response to Hasker will not solve it.
To do this, I want to explain more clearly the counterfactuals Craig
seems to appeal to in his respol1.se to Hasker. According to Craig, the following counterfactuals regarding Peter's options are true:
(4)

If Peter were to freely choose not to preach the Gospel to the
inhabitants of village V, then it would be the case that every
member of V suffers from transworld damnation.

(5)

If Peter were to freely choose to preach the Gospel to the inhabitants of village V, then it would be the case that a subset B of the
population of V would freely accept Christ and be saved. 30

Craig thinks that (4) is true because God wouldn't allow members of V to
be damned who would have accepted Christ had the Gospel been
preached to them. Counterfactual (5) is true because given God's providential governance of the world, Peter's mission work would not be in
vain-son1e people would not suffer from transworld damnation and
would be converted. That is, if Peter were to choose to preach in V, then
the population of V would include a subset B composed of members each
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of whom does not suffer from transworld damnation; but if Peter were to
choose not to do so, then B would be replaced by a set C/l all of whose
members suffer from transworld damnation.
Let's apply Craig's response to the case of Sally who, we will suppose, is an
inhabitant of V in the worlds where Peter chooses not to preach. In those
worlds she is a member of the subset C. So it must be that Sally suffers from
transworld damnation; if she did not suffer from it, then had Peter chosen not
to preach the Gospel in V, she would not have been there. 32 Given what we
know so far, the following counterfactuals seem to be true with respect to Sally:
(6)

If Peter were to freely choose not to preach the Gospel to the
inhabitants of V, then Sally would have come to exist in V.

(7)

If Peter were to freely choose to preach the Gospel to the inhabitants of V, then Sally would not have come to exist in V.

(8)

If Peter were to preach the Gospel to Sally in V, then Sally
would freely reject Christ.

Counterfactual (6) is true because Sally is a member of C in worlds where
Peter does not preach; (7) is true because in those worlds in which Peter
preaches in V, C is replaced by B-all of whose members are free from
transworld damnation, and come to accept Christ as a result of Peter's
preaching. And finally, according to Craig's response, (8) is true because
Sally suffers from transworld damnation and wouldn't accept Christ even if
the Gospel was presented to her.
Now I want to argue that, given that Sally suffers only from TDF 2
transworld damnation, it's possible that (8) is false, and as a result that (7) is
false as weIl. Recall that since Sally suffers from TDF2, in all feasible worlds
in which she is placed in at most moderately persuasive situations with
respect to accepting Christ she does not accept him. It's possible nonetheless that the situation in which Peter preaches to her in V is a moderately
persuasive one such that if she were placed in it she would freely accept
Christ. For it could be that Peter would in fact freely choose not to preach
the Gospel in V, and would choose not to do so in every feasible world in
which he exists. If so, then it could be that Sally would freely accept Christ
in the situation in question (and hence does accept Christ in those worlds in
which Peter brings the Gospel to her), but that all of those worlds in which
she is placed in that situation are infeasible! So it's possible that Sally suffers from transworld damnation (of the TDF2 variety), and (8) is false. Hut
if (8) is false, then (7) probably is as well, since if God were to know that
(9)

If Peter were to preach the Gospel to Sally in V, then Sally
would freely accept Christ,

then God would have every reason to leave her in V if Peter were to decide
to preach there.
So it's possible that (7) and (8) are false. We can see that this result
bodes badly for Craig's contentious suggestion on the TDF 2 interpretation.
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Let's suppose that in the actual world they are false. Suppose that Peter (as
is his wont) decides not to go preach in V. Then, as (6) teIls us, TDF2-sufferer Sally has come to exist there, and since she doesn't accept Christ (or
respond appropriately to general revelation) she is damned. However,
since (7) and (8) are false, had Peter decided to preach she would not have
suffered from TDF2, she would have freely accepted Christ, and she would
have been saved. Hence she suffers from TDF2 because Peter chose not to
preach to her.
According to our current interpretation of Craig's contentious suggestion,
Sally's fate (eternal damnation) is fair even though she never heard the
Gospel message, because she suffers from TDF2. But as we saw in our discussion of Hasker's objection, the fact that uninformed Sally suffers from
TDF2 cannot ensure that her fate is fair if she suffers from it because she is
uninformed-that is, because potential missionaries freely chose not to preach
to her. And that is precisely what has happened: uninformed Sally suffers
from TDF2 because Peter chose not to preach to her. All of the worlds in
which he does preach to her (and she accepts Christ) are infeasible because
of the choices that Peter has made (and would make). I conclude that this
case establishes that on the TDF2 interpretation of transworld danmation,
Craig's contentious suggestion is unacceptable. It cannot be that the fact that
an uninformed person suffers from TDF2 ensures that it is fair that she is
darnned, since she (like Sally) could suffer from TDF2 because potential nussionaries (like Peter) chose not to inform her. 33
There is one more interpretation of transworld darnnation; in the final
section I will explain why, as I see it, the TDS Z interpretation yields the
most acceptable version of Craig's contentious suggestion.
IV
So far, I have considered three interpretations of transworld damnation,
and argued that none of them can be used to render acceptable Craig's contentious suggestion-that it is plausible to suppose that because most of
those who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives stIffer from
transworld damnation, it is fair that they end up in hell regardless of
whether they hear the Gospel. I have argued that on the TDF and TDS
interpretations, it is not at all plausible to suppose that most of those who
don't accept Christ suffer from it. I have also argued that on the TDF2
interpretation, it is not plausible to suppose that if a person suffers from it, it
is fair that she is darnned even if she never heard the Gospel. For her never
hearing the Gospel could be the cause of her suffering from it-she could suffer from TDF2 because potential missionaries freely chose not to preach to
her. I want now to consider briefly the final interpretation of transworld
darnnation. I believe this will best serve Craig's purposes (and perhaps the
purposes of any Molinist who accepts (1) and (2), and wishes to use the
notion of transworld darnnation to help solve the problems (2) generates).
The final interpretation, TDS 2, states that a person who suffers from
transworld damnation is such that he would not accept Christ in any moderately (or less) persuasive situation in which he would be free to do so.
This interpretation, I suggest, does not suffer from the problems that the
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other versions have faced. It seems not utterly implausible to suppose that
most of th.ose who don't accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer from
it; so perhaps on this interpretation the first part of Craig's contentious suggestion is acceptable. Moreover, the fact that a person has TDS2 in no way
depends on the free actions of others, including potential missionaries. So
an uninformed TDS 2-sLlfferer will not suffer from TDS 2 as a result of his
being uninformed.
But even if the TDS 2 version of Craig's contentious suggestion does not
face the debilitating difficulty that the TDF2 version does, it doesn't follow
that it yields a plausible explanation of why it is fair that people who never
hear the Gospel are damned. Keep in mind th.at uninJormed people who
suffer from TDS 2 (and not from TDF or TDS) could be saved-it is within
God's power to save them. How can it be fair then that they aren't? In
other words, how does the fact that an uninformed person suffers from
TDS 2 ensure that it is fair that he is damned when, if he were to be placed
in certain highly persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ or
responding appropriately to general revelation, then he would freely
accept Christ or respond appropriately and be saved? What follows is one
way that someone might answer this question and thereby defend the second part of Craig's suggestion on the TDS 2 interpretation.
Consider an analogy. Take a man in prison serving a long sentence as a
result of a life of crime, and suppose that he did not really know that there
were (morally acceptable) alternatives to the life that he chose for hirnself.
Can he legitimately claim that his prison sentence is unfair, because (unlike
many people) he was ignorant of those alternatives? Well, he could do so
perhaps, if, had an alternative been so much as mentioned to hirn, he would
have chosen it. But suppose we know that that's not the case; for hirn to
have chosen one of the alternative ways of living, that alternative would
have had to have been presented to hirn with a high degree of persuasive
force. That is, suppose he would have had to have been placed in a highly
persuasive situation with respect to choosing the alternative in order for
hirn to do so. It seems plausible, we might suggest, that he cannot legitirnately consider it unfair that he was not placed in that persuasive a situation. There's only so much he can ask for! Hence, it seems that he can't
legitirnately suppose that his ignorance of alternatives renders his prison
sentence unfair. 5imilarly, we might suppose that a person who never
hears the Gospel and suffers from TDS 2 cannot legitimately consider it
unfair th.at he was not placed in a highly persuasive situation with respect
to accepting Christ, and hence cannot legitimately complain that, because
he was uninformed, his fate is unfair. Thus we might conclude that the
fact that an uninformed person suffers from TDS 2 does ensure that it is fair
that he is damned, that the complaint of unfairness has been answered,
and that the TDS 2 interpretation of Craig's contentious suggestion is
acceptable.
But there is more work to be done-since we may again rLln into the
'unfairness' problem a little way down the road. For return to the point
just mentioned: the fact that a person has TDS 2 does not entail that God is
unable to procure his free acceptance of salvation, because there may be
highly persuasive situations in which such a person would freely accept
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Christ 01" respond appropriately to general revelation. This suggests the
possibility that many of those who have accepted Christ in fact da suffer
from TDS 2, but are saved because God ensures that they are placed in
such situations.
Some may think that this is a virtue of the TDS 2 interpretation: it seems
plausible to think that many of us who have accepted Christ are really no
better than those who don't, and that God has bestowed on us a great deal
of (needed) grace to get us to freely accept him. But some may think that
this feature of the TDS 2 interpretation again opens the door to the complaint of unfaimess on behalf of TDS 2 sufferers who are not saved. For if
it is true that some of those who accept Christ sLIffer from TDS 2, it follows
that some who need a great deal of grace actually receive it, while others
who need it (for example, those who suffer from TDS 2 but do not
encounter any highly persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ
in the actual world) do not.
It may be that not everyone who is inclined to accept Craig's contentious suggestion will be bothered by thjs consequence (after all, we
don't expect God to be an egalitarian with respect to the grace he doles
out); but those who are may be able to avoid it. To do so, they may claim
that in fact none of those who are saved suffer from TDS 2, and that God
places people in highly persuasive situations in which they will freely
accept Christ only if he knows that they would also accept Christ in at least
one merely moderately persuasive situation in which they would be free to
do so. If this is so, then God treats all those who suffer from TDS 2 similarly, and the potential unfaimess is eliminated.
So we have seen that Molinists who are inclined to accept the TDS 2
interpretation of Craig's contentious suggestion have some problems to
address. Wehave also seen some possible responses to these problems (01"
at least hints at such responses). Perhaps this version of Craig's contentious suggestion is acceptable then: perhaps it is plausible to suppose
that most of those who do not accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer
from TDS 2, and that the fact that a person suffers from TDS 2 ensures that
it is fair that she ends up in hell, whether she hears the Gospel message or
not. If so, then since (as I have argued) the other interpretations of Craig's
suggestion are unacceptable, any Molinist who wants to accept Craig's
suggestion should accept this interpretation of it. 34
Gf course, not every Molinist will want to accept the TDS 2 interpretation, even if it is the most promising of the interpretations we have canvassed. Craig thinks that if we take Scripture seriously we should accept
(2) (the claim that most people who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives end up in hell), and his contentious suggestion is an attempt to
handle some of the problems that (2) appears to generate. But no doubt
some Molinists will be inclined, as I am, to doubt that serious adherence to
Scripture commits them to as strong a claim as (2), and to wonder whether
even the most promising version of Craig's suggestion can handle the
problems that (2) generates. 35
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1. This question applies also to those who hear the Gospel only in a distorted way-perhaps from an abusive parent. In general, the problems that
arise with respect to the uninformed apply also to the ill-informed, though
throughout this paper I will refer explicitly only to the uninformed.
2. Thus Molinism represents an attempt to reconcile a libertarian view of
creaturely freedoll1 with a strong view of divine providence. The Molinist
claims that God has real and comprehensive control over what happens-that
God is never caught by surprise by the actions of his creatures-but also that
human beings are not mere cogs in a machine God has created. The free
actions of God's creatures play an important role in how the world turns out,
and creatures are responsible for their actions, even though God knows logically prior to creating the world exactly what actions those creatures will choose
to perform. For an in-depth explanation and defense of Molinism, see Thomas
Flint's Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1998).
3. He addresses these issues in '''No Other Name': AMiddIe Knowledge
Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ," Faith and
Philosophy,6 (1989), pp. 172-88. Page references in the text will be to this essay.
4. Craig states his view even more strongly when he says, "The testimony
of Scripture is that the mass of humanity do not even respond to the light that
they do have," and "If we take Scripture seriously, we must admit that the vast
majority of persons in the world are condemned and will be forever lost" (176).
5. To elaborate: a feasible world is a possible world that God is able to
actualize. According to the Molinist, there are some possible worlds that God is
not able to actualize. To see how this might be the case, consider the following.
Suppose that God knows that it is true that if you were placed in circumstances
C, you would freely perform action A (pet your basset hound, say). Now surely
it is possible for you to freely refrain from performing A in C-in some possible
world you are placed in C and do not perform A. But given that the counterfactual C ~ A is true (and its truth is not up to God), it follows that the possible
world in which you are in C but do not freely perform A (and instead freely
refrain from petting your basset hound) is not one that God is able to actualize.
So that world is merely possible, while the world in which you are placed in C
and freely perform Ais feasible, since (so far forth) God is able to actualize it.
6. On Craig's view, damnation is not by its very nature unfair. Indeed,
Craig believes (as do many Christians) that all of us deserve damnation:
"Given the universality of sin, all persons stand morally guilty and condenmed
before God" (172). Fortunately, God has provided a means of salvation to rescue some of us from the fate that we deserve. It may seem unfair, however,
that while some people get the opportunity to accept Christ and attain salvation, many others do not; Craig intends to use the notion of transworld damnation to ward off that charge of unfaimess.
7. And Craig also has an answer to the complaint that it isn't fair for God
to create hell-bound individuals in the first place: their existence helps to make
the world a sufficiently good one-one in which a sufficient number of people
are saved-and it is only proper for God to create a sufficiently good world.
8. I do not mean to imply that what I am calling Craig's contentious suggestion is the only contentious part of his position.
9. See his "Middle Knowledge and the Damnation of the Heathen: A
Response to William Craig," Faith and Philosophy, 8 (1991), pp. 380-89, especially p. 381, where he says that "transworld damnation is the property of being
such that in every feasible world in which one exists one 'freely does not
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respond to God's grace and so is lost.'" (Hasker's response to Craig will be
discussed in Section 111.)
10. One might be tell1.pted to think that TDS implies that those who suffer
from it freely reject Christ in every possible world in which they have the opportunity to do so. But TDS has no such implication. TDS-sufferer Joe is such
that for any situation J in which he would be free with respect to accepting
Christ, if he were placed in J he would freely reject Christ. Counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom are contingent, however; in some possible worlds Joe is such
that he would freely accept Christ in J. Given Joe's condition, the worlds in
which he freely accepts Christ in Jare infeasible. But they are not impossible.
11. That is, perhaps most situations in which one would be free with
respect to accepting Christ don't obtain in any feasible worlds.
12. Keep in mind that I will not be arguing that it is plausible that every
person encounters many persuasive situations in each feasible world in which
she exists, since it seems clear that many people don't encounter any such situations in the actual world. 1nstead, I will be arguing that it is plausible to suppose that for any person, the SUll1. of all of the persuasive situations she faces in
all of the feasible worlds in which she exists (i.e., three situations in W, foul" in
W*, one in W**, none in W***, and so on), is very large.
13. But perhaps this situation would not eliminate the agent's freedom.
The parable of Lazarus and the rich man (Luke 16: 19-31) certainly suggests
that one could encounter situations like this and fail to accept Christ as a result.
(As Abraham says of the rich man's brothers (verse 31), "lf they do not listen to
Moses and the Prophets, they will not be convinced even if someone rises from
the dead.") So perhaps it's plausible to suppose that to accept Christ is inherently a free act. I will not assume that this is the case in what follows; but note
that if it is, then, since maximally persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ entail that the agent's freedom is eliminated, it follows that there are
no maximally persuasive situations with respect to accepting Christ. Then the
Gabriel situation just described in the text is not maximally persuasive, and
any person who suffers from TDF is such that if she encounters a Gabriel situation in some feasible world, she does not freely accept Christ in that world.
14. Indeed, Craig's view appears to be that in every feasible world in which one
exists and is not exposed to the Gospel, one is free to respond appropriately to general revelation. ("In each world in which they exist God loves and wills the salvation of persons who in the actual world have only general revelation [and no doubt
of all other persons as well], and He graciously and preveniently solicits their
response by His Holy Spirit" (185).) My contention is that those unfortunate people
who face few situations in which they are free to accept Christ in the feasible
worlds in which they exist are such that in many of those worlds the situations in
which they are free to respond to general revelation are very persuasive ones.
15. 01" by passing on the Gospel message to A directly, without depending
on his free creatures. To grant this possibility would make my case much easier of course: if it is plausible to think that in many worlds God gives the Gospel
ll1.eSsage directly to people who wouldn't hear it otherwise, then it is surely
plausible to think that every person faces many persuasive situations with
respect to accepting Christ in the worlds God is able to actualize. For the sake
of this discussion, however, I will go on assuming that God relies on the free
actions of his creatures in order to bring about persuasive situations with
respect to accepting Christ, even though God at least sometimes doesn't rely
on his creatures in order to bring about persuasive situations with respect to
responding appropriately to general revelation.
16. For simplicity, in what follows I will usually leave this qualification
unstated.
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17. Indeed, it may not even be plausible to suppose that she has not
responded appropriately to general revelation in the actual world.
18. I'm assuming here that what I have said about the uninformed applies
also to the ill-informed (see note 1), and that the uninformed and ill-informed
make up a significant majority of those who don't accept Christ during their
earthly lives. So if TDF is a rare property with respect to the uninformed and
ill-informed, it is also a rare (though perhaps not as rare) property with respect
to all those who don't accept Christ.
19. In note 33 I explain a further problem that the TDF version faces.
20. For both definitions, a clause about general revelation should be added,
but to avoid undue complication I will not do that. We can just stipulate that a
person who suffers from either of the weakened versions of transworld
damnation will also not respond appropriately to general revelation in any
moderately persuasive situation in which he is free to do so.
21. Similarly, while God would be unable to procure an appropriate free
response to general revelation from one who suffered from TDF or TDS, God
would be able to do so fron1 one who suffered merely from TDF2 or TDS 2.
22. It might be suggested that since God is able to prompt those who suffer
merely from TDF2 or TDS Z to freely accept Christ (whereas God is not able to
do so for those who suffer from TDF or TDS), we shouldn't refer to TDF2 or
TDS 2 as versions of transworld damnation. But since there are some rather
serious limits on God's ability to prompt sufferers of TDF Z or TDS 2 to freely
accept Christ, I will continue to refer to them as weakened interpretations of
transworld damnation.
23. Of course, it could be that not all of the members of V will suffer from
transworld danmation, since there may be some non-afflicted members who
will respond appropriately to general revelation. For simplicity, I will not
mention this qualification in what follows.
24. The relevant essay is cited in note 9 above.
25. Ibid., p. 384.
26. It could be that all of them will suffer from transworld damnation
regardless of whether Peter will preach to them. In that case, Peter's work (if
he decides to preach in V) will bear no fruit. But since it is unlikely that Peter's
work will bear no fruit, it's probably the case that (3) is true, and that some
inhabitants of V are such that whether they suffer from transworld damnation
depends on what Peter will choose. For simplicity, I will not mention this
qualification in what follows.
27. See his "Should Peter Go to the Mission Field?" Faith and Philosophy, 10
(1993), pp. 261-65.
28. Ibid., p. 262.
29. Or at least not in the way that Hasker claims it does-see note 33 for discussion of a similar problem that the TDF interpretation faces.
30. Note that the qualifications mentioned in endnotes 23 and 26 apply to
(4) and (5) as weIl.
31. One may wonder whether there might not be any such set as C. After
all, take the possible world in which Peter preaches in V and a subset B of the
population is saved. Couldn't God sin1ply refrain from replacing the members
of B in the world in which Peter doesn't preach in V? In that case, the population of V would consist of the union of the two sets V-B and B in those worlds
in which Peter preaches, but consist merely of V-B in those worlds in which he
doesn't. Of course, it seems possible for God to do this; but Craig seems to
suggest that this is not the way things would go. Speaking of the world in
which the counterfactual where Paul-a retired preacher who has spent his life
doing missionary work--ehooses not to do so is actual, Craig says this:

260

Faith and Philosophy

... [P]erhaps God, knowing via His middle knowledge that [Paul] would
not go to the tribes in question would not have placed there the people
which He in fact has [namely, people who accepted Christ when Paul
preached to them], but would have created other people instead whom
He knew would not in any case respond to the gospel even if they heard
it. ("Should Peter Go to the Mission Field?" p. 262)
The suggestion here seems to be that the people (call them members of C) who
would have been created if Paul hadn't preached would have replaced the
members of B (they would have been created instead of the members of B).
(Perhaps Craig's underlying idea here is that in those two possible worlds (the
actual one in which Paul preaches to the tribe and the merely possible one in
which he doesn't), the same people inhabit the tribe through the generations
up to the generation affected by Paul's choice. The generation prior to the one
directly affected also reproduces in the same way in both worlds, but in the
actual world some of the offspring are instantiations of essences not afflicted
with transworld damnation (members of B), while in the merely possible
world the corresponding offspring are instantiations of essences which do suffer from it (and are members of C).)
32. We are assuming the appropriate qualifications to the effect that Sally
does not respond appropriately to general revelation.
33. It is important to notice that while TDFZ suffers from this problem in a
serious way (that is, it leaves open the possibility that an uninformed person
suffers from transworld damnation because potential missionaries choose not
to inform her), the stronger TDF might suffer from it too. To see this, we can
adjust our 'uninforn1ed Sally' example. Suppose that Sally suffers from TDF,
so she fails to freely accept Christ in every feasible world in which she exists. It
is still passible that in the infeasible world in which Peter preaches to Sally in V,
she freely accepts Christ. Gf course, it is not too probable that she would, given
that she suffers from TDF (and freely rejects Christ (or fails to respond appropriately to general revelation) in numerous highly persuasive situations with
respect to accepting him-situations which likely are far more persuasive than
is the one in which Peter preaches to her); but it is certainly possible that she
would accept Christ in that world, and hence it is possible that uninformed
Sally suffers from TDF transworld damnation because of Peter's choice not to
inform her. So the TDF interpretation of Craig's contentious suggestion
should be rejected on two counts: it is extremely implausible to suppose that
most of those who don't accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer from
TDF, and it is possible that an uninformed person suffers from it because
potential missionaries choose not to inform her.
34. As I understand him, Craig himself would not accept this version of his
contentious suggestion, for the following reason: if n1any of the damned suffer
from TDS Z (and not from the stronger TDF or TDS), then, as we have seen,
they are such that God cauld attain their free acceptance of salvation. Craig
would not be happy with this consequence, for he believes that God saves
everyone whom God is able to save: "Since God loves all persons and desires
the salvation of all, He supplies sufficient grace for salvation to every individual" (186, emphasis mine). But if my argument to this point has been sound,
this is a consequence of the only tenable interpretation of Craig's suggestion.
35. I am very grateful to Tom Crisp, Alicia Finch, David VanderLaan, the
editor and two referees for Faith and Philasophy, and especially Tom Flint for
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

